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NOTE ON THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF LEAST CORE
CONCEPTS FOR MIN-COST SPANNING TREE GAMES
ULRICH FAIGLE, WALTER KERN, AND DANI ¨EL PAULUSMA
ABSTRACT. Various least core concepts including the classical least core of co-
operative games are discussed. By a reduction from minimum cover problems,
we prove that computing an element in these least cores is in general N P-hard
for minimum cost spannning tree games. As a consequence, computing the nu-
cleolus, the nucleon and the per-capita nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree
games is also N P-hard.
1. INTRODUCTION
Minimum cost spanning tree problems have been widely studied in the literature.
After their introduction by Bird [1976], various results about the core and nucleolus
were established (see, e:g:, Aarts [1994], Granot and Huberman [1981], [1984]).
In this note, we discuss the least core of a cooperative game (see Maschler et
al. [1979]) and several variants of this solution concept. We prove that comput-
ing an allocation according to these least core concepts is in general N P-hard for
minimum cost spanning tree games. It was shown in Faigle et al. [1998b] that
computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is N P-hard. We
obtain this result as an immediate corollary from our main result. Furthermore, we
are able to show that computing other solution concepts such as the nucleon (cf.
Faigle et al. [1998a]) of minimum cost spanning tree games is N P-hard.
A cooperative game is described by a pair .N; c/, where N is a finite set of n
players and c : 2N ! RC is a cost function satisfying c.;/ D 0: A coalition is a
subset S N . c.S/ is called the cost of coalition S with the interpretation that c.S/
is the joint cost of the players in S if they decide to cooperate.
A central problem in cooperative game theory is to find a ’fair’ allocation of the
total costs c.N / to the players. A vector x 2 RN is an allocation if x.N / D c.N /.
(Throughout the paper, we use the shorthand notation x.S/ D
X
i2S
xi.)
The idea of the core of a game essentially goes back to von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [1944]. core(c) is the set of all allocations x for which there is no coalition
S  N such that x.S/ > c.S/, which means that no coalition should have to pay
more than its cost.
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There are games for which core(c) is empty. The least core of a game attempts to
maximize the satisfaction c.S/− x.S/ over all coalitions S 6D ;; N . leastcore(c) is
defined to consist of all optimal solutions x for the linear program
max 
s:t x.S/  c.S/−  for all S ( N; S 6D ;
x.N / D c.N /:
It is not hard to see that leastcore(c) is non-empty.
A minimum cost spanning tree game (MCST-game, for short) is defined by a set N
of players, a supply node s =2 N , a complete graph with vertex set V D N [ fsg and
by a non-negative distance or length function l  0 defined on the edge set of the
complete graph. The cost c.S/ of a coalition S  N is, by definition, the length of
a minimum spanning tree in the subgraph induced by S [ fsg.
It is well-known that core(c) is non-empty for MCST-games and core vectors can
be found in polynomial time: Suppose T is a minimum spanning tree belonging
to a MCST-game. Let x be the allocation vector that allocates to player i 2 N the
weight of the first edge i encounters on the (unique) path from i to s in T . Granot
and Huberman [1981] have proved that x 2 core(c).
However, Granot and Huberman [1981] also point out that allocation vectors ob-
tained from the construction above may not be acceptable from a modeling point
of view. This motivates the search for allocations for example in the least core and
the following generalization of this solution concept. Consider the set of allocation
vectors that are optimal solutions of the linear program
.Pf / max 
s:t x.S/  c.S/−  f .S/ for all S ( N; S 6D ;
x.N / D c.N /;
for a given function f : 2N ! RC. Denote this set by f -leastcore(c). Obviously,
the larger f .S/ is for some coalition S  N , the more decisive S is for determin-
ing the optimum value of (Pf ). We therefore call a function f as above a priority
function, which is closely related to the concept of a taxation function (see, e.g.,
Shapley and Shubik [1966], Tijs and Driessen [1986]). Note that f  1 corre-
sponds with the classical least core of Maschler et al. [1979]. Moreover, because
of the non-emptiness of core(c) of a MCST-game,
f -leastcore.c/  core.c/ for all f : 2N ! RC:
We prove that the problem of computing an element of f -leastcore(c) of general
MCST-games is N P-hard for a large class of priority functions f . This class in-
cludes the following examples already known in the literature (see, Faigle and
Kern [1993], Shapley and Shubik [1966])
 f .S/ D 1 for all S ( N; S 6D ;
 f .S/ D c.S/ for all S ( N; S 6D ;
 f .S/ D jSj for all S ( N; S 6D ;:
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The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems. We show that com-
puting a leastcore-allocation for a special class of graphs introduced in Faigle et
al. [1997] is already N P-hard. These graphs will be treated in Section 2. Section 3
contains the proof of the theorem. In this section, we also introduce the f -nucleolus
which is a generalization of the nucleolus (see Schmeidler [1969]). In Section 4,
the functions mentioned above are treated. By giving sufficient conditions for a
priority function f to satisfy a number of properties defined in Section 3, we prove
that computing an element of f -leastcore(c) of MCST-games is N P-hard for these
functions. As a consequence of the main theorem, computing the nucleolus, the
nucleon and the per-capita nucleolus of MCST-games is in general N P-hard. We
end this section by mentioning some open problems.
2. EXACT COVER GRAPHS
Let q 2 N, and let U be a set of k  q elements and W be a set of 3q elements.
Consider a bipartite graph with node set U [ W (partitioned into U and W) such
that each node u 2 U is adjacent to exactly three nodes in W . We say that the node
u 2 U covers its three neighbors in W .
A set D  U is called a cover if each w 2 W is incident with some u 2 D. A
minimum cover is a cover that minimizes jDj. Finding a minimum cover is a well-
known N P-hard problem. It includes the N P-complete problem known as EXACT
3-COVER (“X3C”) (cf. Garey and Johnson [1979]).
Even finding a minimum cover under the following assumptions is N P-hard.
(C1) Each node in W has degree 2 or more.
(C2) The size of a minimum cover is at most qC 2.
This can be shown as follows: Suppose w 2 W is a node with degree 1, w is
connected to u and u is also connected to w1 and w2. Add a vertex Ou to U and
connect it to w, w1 and w2. The size of a minimum cover will not change. Hence
computing the size of a minimum cover, in case (C1) holds, is at least as hard as
computing the size of a minimimum cover in the general case. To show the validity
of (C2), add vertices u1; u2; : : : ; uq to U that cover W . Each ui .i D 1; : : : ; q/
covers exactly 3 vertices in W . Next delete uq. The size of a minimum cover will
be less than or equal to qC 2. If the size is greater than q, the original problem has
no exact cover. If the size of a minimum cover is equal to q, then also delete uq−1.
Again the size of a minimum cover will be at most q C 2. If the size is greater
than q, the original problem has no exact cover. If the size is equal to q, also delete
uq−2 and so on. In each step of the procedure only problems that have a minimum
cover with size at most qC 2 are considered. If u1 would be deleted, one arrives at
the original problem. Hence computing the size of a mimimum cover, in case (C2)
holds, is at least as hard as computing the size of a minimum cover in the general
case.
We construct an MCST-game from a minimum cover problem as follows (cf. Faigle
et al. [1997]). Define the graph G D .V; E/ such that the node set of G consists
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of U [W and three additional nodes: The Steiner node St, the guardian g, and the
supply s. The edge set E of G comprises the following:
 all edges e from the bipartite graph on U [W , each of them having length
l.e/ D qC 1;
 for each u 2 U, an edge .u; St/ between u and St of length l.u; St/ D q and
an edge .u; g/ between u and g of length l.u; g/ D qC 1;
 an edge .St; g/ between St and g of length l.St; g/D qC 1;
 an edge .g; s/ between g and s of length l.g; s/ D 2q− 1.
q+1
W
U
g
s
St
q+1
q
...
...
...
2q-1
q+1
Figure 2.1
We extend G to the complete graph G on V with distances induced from G, i:e:, if
e D .i; j/ is an edge in G, then l.i; j/ is the length of a shortest path from i to j in
G.
A minimum spanning tree (“MST”) in G is obtained by connecting each w 2 W to
some u 2 U by which it is covered. Such a u 2 U exists because each node w 2 W
has a neighbor in U (indeed, it has at least 2 neighbors in U). Then one connects
each u 2 U to St, and finally connects St to g and g to s. The resulting MST has a
total length of
c.N / D 3q.qC 1/C kqC 3q:
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Furthermore note that, by (C1), each w 2 W is covered by at least two vertices in
U. Hence it is straightforward to see that the following property holds for G:
(L) For each v 2 U [W , there exists a MST T in the graph G such that v is a leaf
of T .
3. THE f -LEAST CORE OF MINIMUM COVER GRAPHS
Consider a graph G D .V; E/ and its completion G as described in the previous
section. The f -leastcore(c), relative to a priority function f : 2N ! RC, of the
corresponding MCST-game consists of all allocation vectors that are optimal solu-
tions of the linear program
.Pf / max 
s:t: x.S/  c.S/−  f .S/ for all S ( N; S 6D ;
x.N / D c.N /;
where N D Vnfsg and c.S/ is the length of a MST in G connecting S to the supply
s.
A basic observation is now the following. If a node v 2 N occurs as a leaf in some
MST T for G and if e is the unique edge in T incident with v, then Tne is a MST
for Vnfvg. Thus c.Nnfvg/D c.N /− l.e/, where l.e/ is the length of e.
Hence, by property (L) of the previous section, the feasibility constraints of .Pf /
imply the following inequalities
x.w/  qC 1C  f .Nnfwg/ .w 2 W /
x.u/  qC  f .Nnfug/ .u 2 U/:
Furthermore, the coalition S D Nnfgg can be connected to the supply node s at a
total cost of c.N /. Hence, the feasibility constraints of .Pf / also imply
x.g/   f .Nnfgg/ :
This motivates the following definition.
For  > 0, let x 2 RN be the vector defined by
x.w/ D qC  f .Nnfwg/ for all w 2 W
x.u/ D qC 1C  f .Nnfug/ for all u 2 U
x.g/ D  f .Nnfgg/
x.St/ D c.N /− x.U [W [ fgg/:
Motivated by the examples mentioned in Section 1, we restrict our attention to
priority functions f that depend only on the size and the cost of a coalition, i.e.,
we consider functions (also denoted by f ) of the type f : N R! RC, which
we always assume to be efficiently computable, and set f .S/ D f .jSj; c.S//. For
technical reasons, we assume that f .S/ > 0 whenever jSj > 0 and c.S/ > 0.
It is straightforward to check that the following parameters do not depend on the
particular representative w 2 W or u 2 U:
fw :D f .Nnfwg/ .w 2 W /
f u :D f .Nnfug/ .u 2 U/:
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Define for a cover D  U
 f .D/ D jDj C 2q− 1jDj f u C 3q fw C f .Nnfgg/C f .D [W [ fgg/ ;
and let
 f D minf f .D/jD  U covers Wg:
Remark 3.1 Suppose D  U is a cover and consider the coalition S D D [W [
fgg. The cost c.S/ is easily seen to be c.S/ D 3q.qC 1/C jDj.qC 1/C 2q− 1,
i.e., c.S/ depends only on jDj. Hence also f .S/ and, therefore  f .D/ only depend
on jDj, i.e., satisfies  f .D1/ D  f .D2/ if jD1j D jD2j for all covers D1; D2  U.
As a consequence, we can a priori compute all possible values of  f .D/ for jDj
ranging from q to k.
Lemma 3.1. If  is the optimal value of .Pf / then    f .
Proof: Let .x; / be an optimal solution of (Pf ). As we have seen, the feasibility
constraints imply
x.w/  qC 1C  fw .w 2 W /
x.u/  qC  f u .u 2 U/
x.g/   f .Nnfgg/:
Suppose D  U is a cover for which  f .D/ D  f . Consider the coalition S D
fgg [ D[W . Then
x.S/   f .Nnfgg/C jDjqC jDj f u C 3q.qC 1/C 3qfw
whereas,
c.S/ D 3q.qC 1/C jDj.qC 1/C 2q− 1:
Since x.S/  c.S/−  f .S/, we get
  jDj C 2q− 1jDj f u C 3q fw C f .Nnfgg/C f .D [W [ fgg/ D 
f :
}
We call a priority function f : 2N ! RC feasible if f satisfies the following prop-
erties (with respect to MCST-games on minimum cover graphs):
(P1)  f is the optimal value of .Pf /:
(P2) For a cover D  U of size q  jDj  qC 2, we have
 f D  f .D/ if and only if D  U is a minimum cover.
Our main result can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 3.1. For the class of feasible priority functions, the problem of comput-
ing an allocation vector x 2 f -leastcore(c) of MCST-games is N P-hard.
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Proof: First we will show that for all w 2 W
x.w/ D qC 1C  f fw:
Suppose .x;  f / is an optimal solution of .Pf /. The feasibility constraints imply
x.w/  qC 1C  f fw .w 2 W /
x.u/  qC  f f u .u 2 U/
and x.g/   f f .Nnfgg/:
Now let D  U be a cover for which  f D  f .D/. Consider the coalition S D
fgg [ D[W . Then
3q.qC 1C  f fw/C jDj.qC  f f u/C  f f .Nnfgg/
 x.S/
 c.S/−  f f .S/
D 3q.qC 1C  f fw/C jDj.qC  f f u/C  f f .Nnfgg/:
Hence x.S/  c.S/−  f f .S/ implies that for all w 2 W
x.w/ D qC 1C  f fw:
Hence x 2 f -leastcore(c) provides us with the value of the parameter  f . We can
efficiently compute the size jDj of a minimum cover D  U as follows: Compute
 f .D/ for jDj D q, jDj D qC 1 and jDj D qC 2 (cf. Remark 3.1). By (C2), it
suffices to compute  f .D/ only for these sizes. By (P2),  f D  f .D/ for at least
one of these sizes. Note that a cover D of size jDj  k− 2 implies the existence of
covers with size jDj C 1 and jDj C 2. Hence, by (P2), the size of a minimum cover
jDj will be the maximum of the sizes for which equality holds.
Given an allocation vector x 2 f -leastcore(c), we can thus compute the size of a
minimum cover D in polynomial time. Hence the computation of such a vector is
at least as hard as the computation of the size of a minimum cover.
}
Theorem 3.2. The set of feasible priority functions f : 2N ! RC forms a convex
cone (minus f  0).
Proof: It is obvious that  f is feasible for  > 0 if f is feasible. Now suppose
f1; f2 : 2N ! RC are feasible. We will show that f :D f1 C f2 is feasible. It is
straightforward to verify that for all covers D  U
 f .D/ D 
f1.D/ f2.D/
 f1.D/C  f2.D/ :
This expression is minimal if and only if  f1.D/ and  f2.D/ are minimal. Let
D  U be a cover with q  jDj  qC 2. Since f1 and f2 satisfy (P2),  f1.D/ and
 f2.D/ are minimal if and only if D is a minimum cover. Hence f satisfies (P2).
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To show that (P1) holds for f , let D U be a minimum cover. Hence  f D  f .D/.
We claim that  f D , the optimum value of (Pf ). By Lemma 3.1, it suffices to
show that  f is a feasible value for (Pf ).
Suppose .x1;  f1 / is an optimal solution for (Pf1) and .x2;  f2 / is an optimal solu-
tion for (Pf2). Define
x.v/ D 
f2 x1.v/C  f1 x2.v/
 f1 C  f2 for all v 2 N:
(Note that x.N / D c.N / because x1 and x2 are allocations.)
Suppose S ( N; S 6D ;: Then
c.S/−  f f .S/ D c.S/− 
f1 f2
 f1 C  f2 . f1.S/C f2.S//
D 
f2.c.S/−  f1 f1.S//C  f1.c.S/−  f2 f2.S//
 f1 C  f2
 
f2 x1.S/C  f1 x2.S/
 f1 C  f2
D x.S/:
}
Priority functions f suggest to extend the notion of the classical nucleolus tot the
f -nucleolus as follows: We define the excess of a non-empty coalition S ( N (with
respect to x) as the number
e.S; x/ D
8<:
c.S/− x.S/
f .S/ if f .S/ > 0
1 if f .S/ D 0:
The excess vector 2.x/ is obtained by ordering the 2N − 2 excess values e.S; x/
in a non-decreasing sequence. The f -nucleolus is then defined to be the set of
all allocation vectors x 2 RN that lexicographically maximize the excess vector
2.x/. If f only depends on the size of a coalition, i.e., f .S/ D f .T / if jSj D jT j
for all coalitions S; T 6D ;; N , f -nucleolus(c) coincides with the f -nucleolus of
Wallmeier [1983].
For f given by f .S/ D 1 for all S 6D ;; N , the f -nucleolus is equal to the nucle-
olus (see Schmeidler [1969]). For f given by f .S/ D c.S/ for all S 6D ;; N , the
f -nucleolus is called the nucleon (see Faigle et al. [1998a]) and for f given by
f .S/ D jSj for all S 6D ;; N , the f -nucleolus is called the per-capita nucleolus
(see, e.g., Young et al. [1982]).
Because it is clear that f -nucleolus(c)  f -leastcore(c), the following corollary
holds.
Corollary 3.1. For the class of feasible priority functions, the problem of comput-
ing an allocation vector x 2 f -nucleolus(c) of MCST-games is N P-hard.
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4. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section, we assume that a priority function f : 2N ! RC satisfies the
following conditions with respect to MCST-games on minimum cover graphs.
Thereby we call a coalition S  N connected, if the induced subgraph G.S/ D
.V .S/; E.S// is connected.
Conditions:
(S1) fw  f u  .1C 1q / fw
(S2) There exists a number M 2 RC, independent of q and k, for which
f .S/  M fw for all S ( N; S 6D ;:
(S3) For all S; S0 ( N with S; S0 connected, jSj > 13 q and 0  jS0j − jSj  2
j f .S0/− f .S/j  1
4
fw:
Theorem 4.1. Let the priority function f : 2N ! RC satisfy conditions (S1), (S2)
and (S3). Then f satisfies (P1) and (P2), provided q is sufficiently large.
Proof: Let D  U be a cover with minimum size. We will prove that x :D x f .D/
and  :D  f .D/ are feasible for .Pf /. By Lemma 3.1 and the definition of  f ,
 f D  f .D/ is then the optimal value of (Pf ). Because  f .D/ and, therefore  f
only depends on jDj (cf. Remark 3.1), D can be any minimum cover. Finally, we
will show that  f <  f .D/ for all covers D  U that are not minimal.
Let S ( N; S 6D ; maximize .S/ :D x.S/− c.S/C  f .S/: We have to show that
.S/  0: Suppose .S/ > 0.
Recall that,
x.w/ D qC 1C  fw for all w 2 W
x.u/ D qC  f u for all u 2 U
x.g/ D  f .Nnfgg/:
For the rest of the proof, we need the following relations.
(4.1) 23
1
fw   
3
4
1
fw :
(4.2) If S ( N connected and .S/ > 0 , then jSj > 1
3
q:
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Proof of (4.1): We have
 D jDj C 2q− 1jDj f u C 3qfw C f .Nnfgg/C f .D[W [ fgg/
 jDj C 2q− 1jDj f u C 3qfw
.S1/ jDj C 2q− 1jDj fw C 3qfw
.C2/ 3qC 1
4qC 2
1
fw
 3
4
1
fw ;
and
 D jDj C 2q− 1jDj f u C 3qfw C f .Nnfgg/C f .D [W [ fgg/
.S1/;.S2/ jDj C 2q− 1
jDj.1C 1
q
/ fw C 3qfw C 2M fw
.C2/ jDj C 2q− 1jDj C 3qC 2M C 2
1
fw
 3q− 1
4qC 2M C 2
1
fw (since jDj  q)
 2
3
1
fw (for q sufficiently large):
Proof of (4.2): First we show that x.St/  13 q: We have
x.St/ D c.N /− x.g/− kx.u/− 3qx.w/
 3qC 3q.qC 1/C kq− kq− k f u − 3q.qC 1/− 3qfw
D 3q− k f u − 3qf w
 3q− qf u − 3qf w (since k  q)
.S1/ 3q− 4qf w
.4:1/ 13 q:
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Hence, in particular, x.St/  qC 1C  f u. Thus, for S ( N , we have
x.S/ .S1/ .qC 1C  f u/jSj C  f .Nnfgg/
.S1/;.S2/ .qC 1C .1C 1q / fw/jSj C M f w
.4:1/ .qC 2/jSj C M;
c.S/  qjSj C q− 1;
and
 f .S/ .S2/ M f w
.4:1/ M:
Hence
0 < x.S/− c.S/C  f .S/
 .qC 2/jSj C M− qjSj − qC 1C M
D 2jSj − qC 1C 2M:
Then jSj > 12 q− 12 − M > 13 q (for q sufficiently large).
This completes the proof of (4.2). We now continue the proof of the theorem by
establishing a sequence of claims.
Claim (1): If St 2 S then jSj < jNj − 1:
Suppose S D Nnfvg for some v 2 fgg [U [W , then .S/D 0 by definition of x.
Claim (2): St 2 S or g 2 S:
Suppose SU[W; SD S1[ S2[ : : :[ Sr with Si .iD 1; : : : ; r/ connected. Then
x.S/ D jS \Uj f u C jS \Wj f w C jS \UjqC jS \Wj.qC 1/
.S1/ jS \Uj.1C 1q / fw C jS \Wj f w C jS \UjqC jS \Wj.qC 1/
.4:1/ 34 jS \Uj.1C 1q /C 34 jS \Wj C jS \UjqC jS \Wj.qC 1/
D 4q2C3qC34q jS \Uj C .qC 74 /jS \Wj;
c.S/  3qC 2q.r − 1/CPriD1.jSij − 1/.qC 1/
D r.q− 1/C qC jSj.qC 1/
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and
 f .S/ .S2/ M f w
.4:1/ M:
Note that for i D 1; : : : ; r
jSi \Wj  2jSi \Uj C 1:
Hence
jS \Uj D
rX
iD1
jSi \Uj 
rX
iD1
jSi \Wj − 1
2
D 1
2
jS \Wj − 1
2
r:
Then
.S/ D x.S/− c.S/C  f .S/
 4q2C3qC34q jS \Uj C .qC 74 /jS \Wj − r.q− 1/− q− jSj.qC 1/C M
D 34 jS \Wj − q−34q jS \Uj − r.q− 1/− qC M
 34 jS \Wj C q−34q . 12r− 12 jS \Wj/− r.q− 1/− qC M
 M C 2− 18 q (since jS \Wj  3q and r  1)
 0 (for q sufficiently large):
Hence g 2 S or St 2 S:
Claim (3): S \U covers S \W:
Up to now, we have proved that a MST for S looks as follows. Each u 2 S \U is
connected to g (with cost qC 1) or to St (with cost q). Each covered w 2 S \W
is connected to a vertex u 2 S \U (with cost qC 1). Each uncovered w 2 S \W
is w.l.o.g. joined to g (with cost 2qC 2) or to St (with cost 2qC 1). Now suppose
w 2 S \W is not covered by S \U. Suppose w is covered by u.=2 S/. Then
c.Snfwg [ fug/  c.S/− .qC 1/;
and
.Snfwg [ fug/− .S/
D x.u/− x.w/C c.S/− c.Snfwg [ fug/C . f .Snfwg [ fug/− f .S//
.S2/ . f u − fw/C q− M f w
.S1/;.4:1/ q− 34 M
> 0 (for q sufficiently large);
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contradicting the maximality of .S/: Hence S \U covers S \W . In particular, S
is connected and, by (4.2), jSj > 13 q.
Claim (4): S contains all w covered by S \U.
Suppose w 2 W is covered by S \U and w =2 S. By (1), jNnSj  2: Then
.S [ fwg/− .S/ D x.w/C c.S/− c.S [ fwg/C . f .S [ fwg/− f .S//
D . f w C f .S [ fwg/− f .S//
>.S3/ 0;
contradicting the maximality of .S/:
Claim (5): St =2 S:
Suppose St 2 S: If S \ U D U then, by (4), S \ W D W . Hence S D Nnfgg in
contradiction to (1). Suppose u =2 S. By (1), jNnSj > 1: Then
.S [ fug/− .S/ D x.u/C c.S/− c.S [ fug/C . f .S [ fug/− f .S//
D . f u C f .S [ fug/− f .S//
.S1/ . f w C f .S [ fug/− f .S//
>.S3/ 0;
contradicting the maximality of .S/.
Claim (6): S \W D W .
Suppose w 2 WnS. By (4), w is not covered by S \U: Because each vertex in W
has at least two neighbors in U, we have jS \Uj  jUj − 2. Suppose w is covered
by u.=2 S/. Then
.S [ fug [ fwg/− .S/
D x.u/C x.w/C c.S/− c.S [ fug [ fwg/C . f .S [ fug [ fwg/− f .S//
D −1C . f u C fw C f .S [ fug [ fwg/− f .S//
>.S1/;.S3/ −1C  32 fw
.4:1/ 0;
contradicting the maximality of .S/:
Claim (7): S D fgg [ D[W for some minimum cover D  U:
Up to now, we have proved that SD fgg [ D0 [W for some cover D0 U. Suppose
D  U is a cover with jDj < jD0j. W.l.o.g. we may assume that jDj D jD0j − 1
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(otherwise add a sufficient number of vertices u 2 U to D). Let S D fgg [ D [W .
It is obvious that x.S/ D x.S/− q−  f u and c.S/ D c.S/− q− 1. Then
.S/− .S/
D 1C . f .S/− f .S/− f u/
>.S1/;.S3/ 1−  43 fw
.4:1/ 0;
contradicting the maximality of .S/:
We have proved that
S D fgg [ D[W for some minimum cover D  U;
Then (by definition of ) .S/ D 0. Hence .x; / is a feasible solution for (Pf ),
which we had to show.
We complete the proof by showing that  f <  f .D/ for all covers D  U that are
not minimal. Let D0  U be a cover that is not minimal. We have already shown
that .S/ D x f .S/ − c.S/ C  f f .S/ D 0 for all coalitions S D fgg [ D [ W
where DU is a minimum cover and that .S/ .T / for all coalitions T 6D ;; N .
Furthermore, from Claim (7), we know that there exists a cover D  U with jDj D
jD0j− 1 and .fgg [ D[W / > .fgg [ D0 [W /: Then we have .fgg [ D0 [W / <
0, which is equivalent to  f <  f .D0/.
}
It is straightforward to see that the priority functions f given by
 f .S/ D 1 for all S ( N; S 6D ;
 f .S/ D c.S/ for all S ( N; S 6D ;
 f .S/ D jSj for all S ( N; S 6D ;
satisfy (S1), (S2) and (S3). Hence, by Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1, the problem
of computing an allocation vector x 2 f -leastcore(c) of MCST-games is N P-hard
for these functions. By Corollary 3.1, the problem of computing the nucleolus, the
nucleon and the per-capita nucleolus of MCST-games is also N P-hard. Further-
more, one can verify that functions such as, e.g.,
 f .S/ D c.S/jSj for all S ( N; S 6D ;
 f .S/ D c.S/jSj for all S ( N; S 6D ;
satisfy (S1), (S2) and (S3). Hence these functions also belong to the class of feasi-
ble priority functions.
We end our discussion by mentioning some priority functions for which our ap-
proach does not yield any N P-hardness result. In particular, functions that give
high priority to small conditions, such as, e.g.,
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 f .S/ D e−jSj for all S ( N; S 6D ;
 f .S/ D 1jSj for all S ( N; S 6D ;
violate conditions (S2) and (S3).
As an extreme case, suppose there is a set T  N of important individuals. One
may then consider the priority function
f .S/ D

1 if S D fig; i 2 T
0 else:
We do not know whether the f -least core or f -nucleolus for any of these functions
can be computed efficiently.
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